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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The father left before trial and a default judgment was entered against him for
$7,579. The mother then brought suit on the judgment in Washington. A defense
was entered on the ground that the judgment was obtained by fraud and a cross
complaint was filed for one-half the amount the father had expended in the support
of the four other children.
The action was dismissed by the court on the basis of RCW 26.20.010 which provides
for joint and several liability of both the husband and wife for the expenses of the
family and the education of the children. The court said the statute provides that
the obligation of a mother and father for the support of the children is expressly
prescribed as joint and several, not as primary and secondary as under the common
law. There is nothing in the statute which indicates that the legislature intended
that the mother should be entitled to contribution from the father while the children
were in her custody but that there would be no reciprocal right in the father while
the children were in his custody. The court went on to state that while in a divorce
action there exists a wide discretion to adjust the property rights of the parties, in a
subsequent action the court is bound by the statute. In commenting on the evidence
supporting the mother's contention that the father had abandoned her and was con-
sequently barred from claiming contribution, the court said that the evidence was not
only inconclusive but that on the basis of Schoennauer v. Schoennauer, 77 Wash. 132,
137 Pac. 325 (1913), the fact of abandonment was immaterial.
The court disposed of the mother's argument to the effect that the father's claim
should have been interposed in the New York suit by holding that nothing had been
pleaded as a basis for such a decision and that consequently under RCW 4.32.090 the
father's counterclaim was proper as an independent cause of action.
A dissenting opinion pointed out that RCW 26.20.010 had never before been applied
to facts such as these. The dissenting judge felt that the correct rule should be that
a spouse's right to contribution is suspended during such time as the one from whom
contribution is sought is wrongfully deprived of the custody of the child or children
in question, or during any period that the children's whereabouts are wrongfully
concealed.
EVIDENCE
Sound Recordings-Foundation for Admission in Evidence.1 The
foundation which must be laid before a sound recorded confession may
be received in evidence has been prescribed by the Washington Supreme
Court in State v. Williams.2 The Williams case was a rape prosecution
in which the state offered in evidence a tape recording of a conversation
from which a written statement purportedly signed by the defendant
was taken. The trial court admitted the tape recording and the written
statement. On appeal defendant assigned as error admission of the
statement and the recording. The supreme court ruled only on admis-
sion of the recording since it alone was argued in defendant's brief in
support of the assignment of error. The supreme court held that ad-
mission of the recording was prejudicial error because a proper founda-
tion had not been laid. A new trial was granted.
1 Annot., 168 A.L.R. 927 (1947) (a discussion of admissibility of sound recordings
as evidence).
2149 Wash. Dec. 347, 301 P.2d 769 (1956).
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The witness who recorded defendant's statement testified on direct
examination that he had a tape recorder in operation while he was
taking the defendant's statement; that he had prepared the recorder
mechanism so it would function properly; that the conversation which
was recorded was the conversation from which the written statement
was taken; and that the tape recording offered in evidence was a record-
ing of that conversation.
After referring to opinions from other jurisdictions concerning the
foundation required for recordings, the Washington Court approved the
requirements for admission of a dictaphone recording laid down by
the Georgia Court in Solomon, Jr., Inc. v. Edgar.3 In the Solomon
decision the Georgia Court said a proper foundation for the use of
mechanical transcription devices must be laid as follows:
(1) It must be shown that the mechanical transcription device was
capable of taking testimony. (2) It must be shown that the operator of
the device was competent to operate the device. (3) The authenticity
and correctness of the recording must be established. (4) It must be
shown that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made.
(5) The manner of preservation of the record must be shown. (6)
Speakers must be identified. (7) It must be shown that the testimony
elicited was freely and voluntarily made, without any kind of duress.4
The Washington Court in the Williams decision held that the testi-
mony elicited during the direct and cross examinations of the state's
witness failed to provide a proper foundation under the Solomon deci-
sion, but did not specify which requirements had not been satisfied.
Clearly, the foundation laid in the Williams case did not satisfy require-
ments (2), (3). (4), (5), and (7) as set forth above.
As identified by the Washington Court, the problem presented was
one of striking a balance between the application of sufficient safeguards
to assure true reproduction and the imposition of requirements so
stringent that they would tend to discourage the use of this valuable
evidentiary medium. Other aspects of the problem of admissibility of
recordings have been dealt with by the Washington Court,5 but the
Williams decision is one of first impression on the adequacy of founda-
tion and on the admission of a recorded confession.
Analysis of the requirements set forth in the Williams decision re-
3 92 Ga. App. 207, 88 S.E2d 167 (1955).
4Id. at 212, 88 S.E.2d at 171.
5 State v. Lyskoski, 47 Wn.2d 102, 287 P.2d 114 (1955), 31 WAsH. L. REv. 145(1956) ; State v. Slater, 36 Wn.2d 357, 218 P.2d 329 (1950) ; State v. Salle, 34 Wn.2d
183, 208 P.2d 872 (1949).
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veals that a party offering a sound recorded conversation in evidence
must be prepared to present, at the minimum, the testimony of: (1) the
person who operated the recording device; (2) one who was present
when the conversation was recorded; (3) the custodian of the recording
from the time of making until the time of trial; (4) a person who is
familiar with the voices of the speakers. In the typical case the testi-
mony of one witness will satisfy several if not all of these requirements.
The statement of the court that "it must be shown the mechanical
transcription device was capable of taking testimony" is unclear. If the
court means that it must be shown that a device of the type used was
capable of taking testimony, the requirement would appear to be satis-
fied by the testimony of any witness who had recorded conversation on
a device of that type. But if the court means that it must be shown
that the particular device used was, at the time used, capable of taking
testimony, it would appear the requirement would be satisfied only by
the testimony of a witness who had tested that device and had found
it to be in working order immediately prior to the recording of the
conversation in issue.
In view of the push-button simplicity with which modern sound
recording devices operate it is apparent that the requirement of capa-
bility of the operator can be easily satisfied.
The stated requirement of a showing that changes, additions or dele-
tions have not been made would seem to be satisfied simultaneously with
the showing of custodianship if the recording offered is the original one
made.. If the recording offered purports to be a copy of the original
then the showing of lack of changes, additions or deletions would have
to be made by the testimony of a witness familiar personally with the
contents of the original recording or of the conversation itself. It should
be noted that the Washington Court has held that a copy of a recording
is not inadmissible under the best evidence rule.'
It is possible for an expert to dub or to delete material from a wire
or tape recording on its face. Dubbing or deleting requires splicing
the tape or wire. A splice on a tape can be detected by the eye. Major
additions or deletions which would interrupt the conversational tone of
the speaker could also be detected by the ear. But should the altered
tape or wire then be rerecorded, major alterations might still be
audible, but no alterations would then be visible.
The expressed reason that the court in the Williams case adopted
6 State v. Lyskoski, note 5, supra.
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such an extensive foundation is that too little restriction could result
in ingenious fraud and tampering. An interesting comparison here is
that of the foundation necessary for admission in evidence of a photo-
graph, which also is capable of being altered. Proof of accuracy of a
photograph may be given by anyone who has knowledge of the thing
represented thereby, and need not be verified by the photographer
who took it.7
Whether the first six Williams requirements must be satisfied before
a sound recording of a conversation may be received in evidence for
purposes other than a confession is a question at present unanswered.
Until that answer is supplied the practitioner must be prepared to meet
these requirements when he offers such a recording in evidence in a
Washington court.
Privilege Against Self Incrimination-Effects of Claiming. In
Annest v. Annest' plaintiff husband appealed from that portion of
a divorce decree awarding custody of the children and child support
to defendant wife. The trial court found that defendant wife had
committed adultery and that plaintiff had threatened her and her
paramour with criminal prosecution. During cross-examination
defendant, her paramour and his wife declined to answer questions
relating to adultery on the ground their answers would tend to incrimi-
nate them. On appeal plaintiff assigned as error the trial court's
refusal of his motion to strike the entire testimony of these witnesses.
In affirming the decree the Washington Supreme Court held that
since the action was not brought or maintained by defendant, the most
the trial court could have done was to have stricken the testimony, but
failure to strike was not prejudicial error because, even disregarding
this testimony, the record supported the decree.
In the Annest opinion the court quoted the provisions of Rule of
Practice, Pleading and Procedure 42 as in effect at the time of the trial2
and then stated:
7 Kelleher v. Porter, 29 Wn.2d 650, 189 P.2d 223 (1948).
1 149 Wash. Dec. 68, 298 P.2d 483 (1956).
2 34A Wn.2d 106. "Testimony of Adverse Party. A party to an action or proceed-
ing shall not be precluded from examining the adverse party as a witness at the trial.
The testimony of a party at the trial may be rebutted by adverse testimony. If a party
refuse to attend and testify at the trial, his complaint, answer or reply may be stricken
out, and judgment taken against him, and he may also, in the discretion of the court,
be proceeded against as in other cases of contempt; provided this rule shall not be
construed so as to compel any person to answer any question where such answer may
tend to incriminate himself." Rule 42 has since been abrogated and there has been
substituted therefor the provisions appearing in Rule of Pleading, Practice and Proced-
1957]
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A witness who declines to answer a proper question on the ground
that it would tend to incriminate him, has not told the whole truth,
which his oath as a witness requires. He will not be permitted to
testify to part of the truth only. When a party claims the privilege
of not answering a proper question, the court may dismiss his action
or strike his testimony.3
Two prior Washington decisions deal with the effect of a party's
refusal to answer questions on cross examination. In Thomas v.
Dower4 it was held proper to strike the entire testimony of a plaintiff
who refused to answer on the ground of self incrimination. In Rutger
v. Walken' it was held proper under the provisions of Rem. Rev. Stat.
12306 to strike the entire testimony of a plaintiff who refused to
answer responsively during cross examination. Although neither the
statute nor Rule 42 mentions the striking of testimony, the similarity
of their provisions and the Rutger decision indicate that a court may
proceed under this Rule to strike the testimony of a party who refuses
to answer.
Rule 42 as in effect at the time of the Annest trial lends itself to
two possible constructions. The usual function of a proviso is to
limit operation of preceding matter. If this rule of construction be
followed the result would be to exempt from operation of the Rule
those cases where refusal to answer is based on the ground of self
incrimination. For purposes of brevity this construction of Rule 42
will hereafter be referred to in this note as "the exemption construc-
tion." A proviso, however, is sometimes employed to guard against
a possible construction that was not intended. Giving recognition to
this use of a proviso, the Rule may be construed to mean that the
privilege against self incrimination is recognized to the extent that
the party may not be required to relate incriminating matter, but if
he chooses to invoke the privilege he may be penalized as provided
in the Rule. This construction will be hereafter referred to as "the
penalizing construction."
ure 42, 45 Wn.2d xxx. The change in the Rule is not material to the discussion in
this note.
3 149 Wash. Dec. at 69, 298 P2d at 484.
4162 Wash. 54, 297 Pac. 1094 (1931).
5 19 Wn.2d 681, 143 P2d 866 (1943).
6 RCW 5.04.060 (later abrogated and superceded by Rules of Pleading, Practice
and Procedure 44 and 26-37 incl.) "If a party refuse to attend and testify at the trial,
or to give his deposition, or to answer any interrogatories filed, his complaint, answer
or reply may be stricken out, and judgment taken against him, and he may also, in the
discretion of the court, be proceeded against as in other cases for a contempt: Provided,
that this chapter shall not be construed to compel any person to answer any question
where such answer may tend to incriminate himself."
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The propriety of the court's action in striking the defendant's
testimony in the Annest case under the provisions of Rule 42 must
therefore be assessed in light of both constructions of the Rule. Strik-
ing that testimony under the provisions of the Rule is in accord with
"the penalizing construction," but is contrary to "the exemption con-
struction."
There remains to be examined the statement in the Annest deci-
sion: "... . When a party claims the privilege of not answering a
proper question, the court may dismiss his action or strike his
testimony."
The Annest opinion raises some question as to which construction
the Supreme Court has placed on Rule 42. The statement quoted
above is itself ambiguous. One interpretation is that a trial court is
vested with a considerable amount of discretion in dismissing an action
for refusal to testify, and may take into account the propriety of the
claim of privilege and the importance of the subject matter as to
which the privilege was invoked. This interpretation of the court's
language would indicate that the court has placed "the exemption
construction" on Rule 42. But taken in the context of the Annest
opinion where the claim of privilege was properly made and where
the matter to which the claim was asserted was important, this inter-
pretation does not seem too plausible.
A second interpretation of the court's statement is that the trial
court may dismiss the action of a plaintiff who claims the privilege,
while it may only strike the testimony of a defendant who claims the
privilege. This interpretation indicates that the Supreme Court has
placed "the penalizing construction" on the Rule as far as a plaintiff
is concerned. Rule 42 would thus operate to confront a plaintiff with
the choice of either incriminating himself or having his complaint
stricken and judgment entered against him. Confronting a plaintiff
with these alternatives does not seem to work too great a hardship on
him, for he has a choice as to whether he will bring his action and
thus subject himself to being called to testify. Arguably, a plaintiff
should be prepared to freely divulge to the court the matters on which
his action rests. In view of the actual holding in the Annest case, and
the rule of construction favoring that construction which is constitu-
tional, it may well be said that the Washington court intends to con-
front only a plaintiff with this choice.
A third interpretation of the statement is that whenever either the
19571
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plaintiff or the defendant claims the privilege against self incrimina-
tion the court may properly strike his complaint or answer and enter
judgment against him. This interpretation indicates that the court
has placed "the penalizing construction" on the Rule. Under this con-
struction the Rule could operate to compel a defendant who has no
choice in bringing the action or in taking the stand to either incrimi-
nate himself or to have judgment entered against him. Were Rule 42
actually to be applied so as to confront a defendant with this choice
the question of the constitutionality of the Rule as applied could
then arise.
It is doubtful whether applying Rule 42 so as to compel a defendant
to make this choice in a state court would present a constitutional
question under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Con-
stitution.' However, the Rule so construed and applied could raise a
substantial constitutional question under the prohibition against com-




Accident-Determination of Number of Accidents in One Mishap.
The concept of proximate cause was used by the Washington Supreme
Court in -Truck Insurance Exchange v. Rohde' to determine
the number of "accidents" arising from a collision of four vehicles, in
an action brought by the Exchange to determine its liability under a
policy in which Rohde was the named insured.
Rohde, while driving under circumstances conceded to be negligent,
collided with three motorcycles. Rohde's car crossed the center line
and struck the first motorcycle, spun around and then collided with
two other motorcycles traveling in echelon formation seventy-five
feet apart. Rohde did not regain control of his car between the first
and last impacts.
7 The United States Supreme Court has held that the exemption from self incrim-
ination is not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship guaranteed against abridge-
ment by the states by the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment,
nor is it inherent in due process of law which the States are prohibited by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908).
8 Art. I, § 9.
1 149 Wash. Dec. 451, 303 P.2d 659 (1956) petition for rehearing denied 149 Wash.
Dec. 865 (1957).
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